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Abstract
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payos by
cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities {or
simply a TU-game. A value mapping for TU-games is a mapping that assigns to
every game a set of vectors each representing a distribution of the payos. A value
mapping is ecient if to every game it assigns a set of vectors which components
all sum up to the worth that can be obtained by all players cooperating together.
An approach to eciently allocating the worth of the `grand coalition' is
using share mappings which assign to every game a set of share vectors being
vectors which components sum up to one such that every component is the
corresponding players' share in the total payo that is to be distributed among
the players. In this paper we discuss a class of share mappings containing the
(Shapley) share-core, the Banzhaf share-core and the Large Banzhaf share-core.
We provide characterizations of this class of share mappings and show how they
are related to the corresponding share functions being functions that assign to
every TU-game exactly one share vector.
Keywords: TU-Game, Share vector, Core, Reduced Game
1 Introduction
A situation in which a nite set of players can obtain certain payos by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utilities, or simply a TU-game,
being a pair (N; v), where N = f1; : : : ; ng is a nite set of players and v: 2N ! IR is a
characteristic function on N such that v(;) = 0. For any coalition E  N , v(E) is the
worth of coalition E, i.e. the members of coalition E can obtain a total payo of v(E)
by agreeing to cooperate. We denote the collection of all TU-games by G.
A solution of an n-person TU-game is an n-dimensional vector representing a
distribution of payos. A value function on a subset C of G is a function that assigns
a solution to any game in C. A value function f is ecient on C if for any game in
C the total payo it assigns to the players is equal to the worth v(N) of the `grand
coalition', i.e. if
P
i2N fi(N; v) = v(N) for all (N; v) 2 C. An example of an ecient
value function is the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). An example of a value function
that is not ecient is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965)) which is characterized in,
e.g., Lehrer (1988) and Haller (1994). Since the Banzhaf value is not ecient it is not
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adequate in allocating the worth v(N) of the `grand coalition'. In order to allocate v(N)
according to the Banzhaf value van den Brink and van der Laan (1998a) characterized
the normalized Banzhaf value which distributes the worth v(N) proportional to the
Banzhaf values of the players.
An alternative approach to eciently allocating the worth v(N) of the `grand
coalition' is the concept of share functions as introduced in van der Laan and van
den Brink (1998). A share vector for game (N; v) 2 G is an n-dimensional real vector
x 2 IRn such that
P
i2N xi = 1. Here xi is player i's share in the total payo that is to be
distributed among the players. A share function on C  G is a function  that assigns
to every (N; v) 2 C exactly one share vector (N; v) 2 Sn := fx 2 IRn j
P
i2N xi = 1g.
For a game with v(N) 6= 0, the share vector of the game corresponding to the
Shapley value of the game is the Shapley share vector, which is obtained by dividing
the Shapley value of each player by the sum of the Shapley values of all players (being
equal to v(N) since the Shapley value is ecient). For a subset C of G such that
v(N) 6= 0 for any (N; v) 2 C, the Shapley share function on C is dened to be the
function assigning the Shapley share vector to each (N; v) 2 C. Similarly, the Banzhaf
share function on C assigns to any game in the subset the Banzhaf share vector, which
is obtained by dividing the Banzhaf value by the sum of payos over all players (or
equivalently dividing the normalized Banzhaf value by v(N)).
In this paper we will apply the idea of share vectors to set-valued solution concepts
for TU-games. A value mapping on a subset C of G is a mapping M that assigns
a set of solutions M(N; v)  IRn to any game in (N; v) 2 C. A value mapping M
is ecient if
P
i2N yi = v(N) for every y 2 M(N; v) and (N; v) 2 C. A well-known
ecient value mapping is the Core-mapping which assigns to every TU-game (N; v) its
Core. Analogously to share functions, we can dene a share mapping on C  G being a
mapping M on C that assigns to every (N; v) 2 C a set of share vectors M(N; v)  Sn.
Again, by denition a share mapping M is ecient in the sense that all shares sum
up to one for every share vector in M(N; v). We dene the share-core mapping on G
by the mapping C which assigns to a game (N; v) satisfying v(N) 6= 0 the set of share
vectors x for which the vector y given by yi = xiv(N); i 2 N is in the Core of (N; v).
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The set C(N; v) is called the share-core of (N; v).
As is well-known, for so-called convex games the Core is not empty and the
Shapley value is the barycenter of the Core (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981)).
Analogously the Shapley share vector is closely related to the share-core. In the follow-
ing the share-core will therefore also be called the Shapley share-core and the share-core
mapping the Shapley share-core mapping. We generalize the (Shapley) share-core map-
ping in a similar way as the Shapley value function is generalized in van der Laan and
van den Brink (1998). In this way we obtain a class of share mappings which also
contains the so-called Banzhaf share-core mapping and Large Banzhaf share-core map-
ping. We show that the Large Banzhaf share-core has certain appealing properties. In
particular, each monotone game has a non-empty Large Banzhaf share-core and there
exist monotone games for which it consists of exactly one element.
The class of share mappings will be characterized by applying a modied version
of Davis and Maschler's reduced game property as used by Peleg (1986) in character-
izing the Core1. Recall that another famous reduced game property is the Hart and
Mas-Colell reduced game property as introduced in Hart and Mas-Colell (1988, 1989)
in characterizing the Shapley value. In Dragan (1996) an alternative reduced game
property is used for characterizing the Banzhaf value. A modication of these proper-
ties has been used in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999) to characterize a class of
share functions containing the Shapley and Banzhaf share functions.
We conclude the paper by introducing the concept of marginal share vectors
and show that the share vector induced by a share function in this class is equal to the
average of the corresponding marginal share vectors. After generalizing the concept
of convex games, we show that on this subset of games there is a one-to-one relation
between the class of share mappings introduced in this paper and the class of share
functions as given in van den Brink and van der Laan (1999), in the same way as the
Shapley share vector is related to the Shapley share-core for convex games.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state some preliminaries on TU-
1Tadenuma (1992) usues an alternative reduced game property in characterizing the Core. A
general approach to characterizing the core using reduced game properties is given by Funaki and
Yamamoto (1997).
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games and briey discuss the class of share functions as characterized by van der Laan
and van den Brink (1998). In Section 3 we introduce the class of share mappings
and give some properties of the corresponding solution sets of share vectors. In Sec-
tion 4 we discuss some examples of share mappings in this class, such as the Shapley
share-core mapping and the (Large) Banzhaf share-core mapping. We also show the
usefulnes of the share-core mappings introduced by applying them to the special class
of weighted majority voting games. In Section 5 we state the modied version of Davis
and Maschler's reduced game and characterize the class of share mappings as the u-
nique class of share mappings satisfying non-emptyness, and modied versions of the
axioms of the Davis-Maschler reduced game property, superadditivity and individual
rationality. Finally, in Section 6 we discuss marginal share vectors, use these in gener-
alizing the concept of convex games, and show a relation between share mappings and
corresponding share functions.
2 Preliminaries on TU-games and share functions
In this section we give some preliminary concepts and denitions on cooperative games.
For given N and nonempty T  N the unanimity game (N;uT ) is given by uT (E) = 1
if T  E and uT (E) = 0 otherwise, E  N .2 In the sequel we denote jEj for the
number of elements of the set E. From Harsanyi (1959) we know that the characteristic
function v of a game (N; v) can be expressed as a linear combination of the characteristic
functions of the unanimity games (T; uT ), T  N , by v =
P
TN v(T )u
T with v(T )




A TU-game (N; v) is calledmonotone if v(E)  v(F ) for all E  F  N and it is
called convex if for every pair E; F  N it holds that v(E[F )+v(E\F )  v(E)+v(F ).
Observe that any unanimity game is monotone and convex. For a given game (N; v) 2 G
and given T  N , the restriction of (N; v) to T is denoted by the subgame (T; vT ) and
is given by vT (E) = v(E) for all E  T . The class C  G is called subgame closed if
for every (N; v) 2 C and every T  N it holds that (T; vT ) 2 C. Examples of subgame
2Note that we ignore the unanimity games (N; u;). In the paper, when we speak about unanimity
games we mean unanimity games (N; uT ) with T 6= ;.
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closed classes of games are the class of all games G, the class of all monotone games,
and the class of all convex games. Note that a class of games with a xed player set is
not subgame closed.
A game (N; v) is called a null game if v = v0 with v0(E) = 0 for all E  N .
Now, let :G ! IR be a function assigning a real value to any game (N; v) 2 G. The
function :G ! IR is positive on C  G if (N; v) > 0 for all (N; v) 2 C, and it is called
zero on C  G if (N; v) = 0 for all (N; v) 2 C. By G+

 G, respectively G0

 G, we






, i.e. (N; v)  0 for all (N; v) 2 G  G. We call a function :G ! IR
additive on C if for every pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 C such that3 (N; v + w) 2 C
it holds that (N; v + w) = (N; v) + (N;w). A function :G ! IR is linear on C
if it is additive on C and for every (N; v) 2 C and c 2 IR such that (N; cv) 2 C it
holds that (N; cv) = c(N; v). Finally, we call :G ! IR symmetric on C if for every
(N; v) 2 C, every pair of symmetric players4 i; j in (N; v) and every E  N; E  fi; jg,
such that the subgames (E n fig; vEnfig) and (E n fjg; vEnfjg) are in C, it holds that
(E n fig; vEnfig) = (E n fjg; vEnfjg).
We now recall some well-known value functions for cooperative games that are










(N; v) for all i 2 N;
where mi
E
(N; v) = v(E) v(E nfig) is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition
E  N in (N; v) 2 G. As mentioned in the introduction the Shapley value is an ecient
value function.
A value function that is not ecient is the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965)) being
3For a pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 G the game (N; v+w) is given by (v+w)(E) = v(E) +w(E)
for all E  N .
4Players i; j 2 N are symmetric in (N; v) 2 G if v(E n fig) = v(E n fjg) for all E  N with
E  fi; jg.
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(N; v) for all i 2 N:
In order to eciently allocate v(N) according to the Banzhaf value the normalized





can be used. Thus, the normalized Banzhaf value allocates v(N) proportional to the
Banzhaf values of the players.
A general approach to eciently allocating payos in TU-games is using share functions
which are introduced in van der Laan and van den Brink (1998). A share function on
a set of games C  G is a function  that assigns to every game (N; v) 2 C an n-
dimensional real vector (N; v) 2 IRn such that the shares assigned to the players sum
up to one for every game in C, i.e.
P
i2N i(N; v) = 1 for all (N; v) 2 C. The i
th
component is the share of player i 2 N in the value to be distributed, e.g., in v(N).
Three properties that can be satised by such share functions are the following5.
The rst two properties are similar to the null player and symmetry properties
for value functions. The share function  satises the null player property on C if for
every (N; v) 2 C and every null player 6 i in (N; v) it holds that i(N; v) = 0. Share
function  satises symmetry on C if for every (N; v) 2 C and every pair i; j of symmetric
players in (N; v) it holds that i(N; v) = j(N; v). Finally, for some function :G ! IR,
the share function  satises -additivity on C if for every pair of games (N; v); (N;w) 2
C such that (N; v + w) 2 C it holds that (N; v + w)(N; v + w) = (N; v)(N; v) +
(N;w)(N;w). This last property is a generalization of the additivity property which
is obtained by taking (N; v) = 1 for all (N; v) 2 G. Although additivity is a reasonable
property of value functions it does not make sense for share functions. However, a
5In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) ecient shares (meaning that the components of
i(N; v) sum up to one for all (N; v) 2 C is taken as a fourth axiom. In this paper we have taken this
into our denition of a share function.
6Player i 2 N is a null player in (N; v) 2 G if v(E) = v(E n fig) for all E  N .
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share function that satises -additivity for an additive -function satises some kind
of weighted additivity property in the sense that the shares assigned to the sum game
of two games is a convex combination of the shares assigned to the two separate games.
This can easily be seen by rewriting -addivity for an additive -function as (N; v +
w) = (N;v)
(N;v)+(N;w)
(N; v) + (N;w)
(N;v)+(N;w)
(N;w). So,  determines the weights of the
games in this convex combination. What weights are appropriate depends on the
application we have in mind.
The following theorem7 characterizes a class of share functions on subclasses
of games C  G containing all positively scaled unanimity games (N;uT ), T  N ,
 > 0, i.e. uT (E) =  if T  E, and uT (E) = 0 otherwise. Examples of classes of
games that contain all positively scaled unanimity games are the class of all games G,
the class of all monotone games, and the class of all convex games.
Theorem 2.1 (van der Laan and van den Brink (1998))
(i) Let :G ! IR be positive and symmetric on a subclass C  G that contains all
positively scaled unanimity games. Then there exists a unique share function  on
C satisfying the null player property, symmetry and -additivity if and only if  is
additive on C.
(ii) For given positive vectors !n 2 IRn+; n 2 IN, let the function :G ! IR be dened
by (N; v) = !
n
(N; v), where !
n






























for every i 2 N;






7In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) results are stated more general for classes of games
with xed player set.
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The second part of the theorem shows that any choice of positive weights on the
marginal contributions (with equal weights assigned to coalitions of equal size) denes





n . Note that all functions !
n
are positive on all positively scaled unanimity games.
Examples of  functions dened by a vector !n of weights are the function




, t = 1; : : : ; n) and B:G !
IR given by B(N; v) = 1
2n 1
P
EN (2jEj  n)v(E) (with !
n
t
= 2 (n 1) for t = 1; : : : ; n).
In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) it is shown that the unique share function
satisfying the properties stated in Theorem 2.1 with  = S is the Shapley share






for all i 2 N;
on the class of games (N; v) 2 G with v(N) 6= 0, and the unique share function



















for all i 2 N
on the class of games (N; v) for which
P
j2N j(N; v) 6= 0. For other examples closely
related to the Deegan-Packel value (see Deegan and Packel 1979) and the  -value (see
Tijs 1981), we refer to van der Laan and van den Brink (1998)
3 Share mappings






xi(N; v) = v(N);
X
i2E
xi(N; v)  v(E); 8E  N
)
:
Analogously to share functions we can dene a share mapping on C  G being a
mapping M on C that assigns to every (N; v) 2 C a set of share vectors M(N; v) 
Sn = fx 2 IRn j
P











In the following C(N; v) is called the share-core. Clearly, if v(N) 6= 0, we have that
x 2 C(N; v) if and only the vector y given by yi = xiv(N) is an element of Core(N; v).
Observe that this relation may not hold when v(N) = 0. In that case the Core becomes
the set Core(N; v) = fx 2 IRnj
P
i2N xi(N; v) = 0;
P
i2E xi(N; v)  v(E); 8E  Ng,
whereas C(N; v) = ; if there exists some E  N with v(E) > 0, and C(N; v) = Sn
if v(E)  0 for all E  N . Observe that in this case a vector y 2 Core(N; v) may
contain positive and negative components, whereas C(N; v) is either empty or is equal
to Sn. However, if v(N) = 0 we have that for any x 2 C(N; v), it holds that player i
gets share xi in the zero worth v(N), i.e. independent of the share vector x each player
i gets a payo yi = xiv(N) = 0 if v(N) is to be distributed. Clearly, if we distribute
v(N) = 0, the shares assigned to the players do not matter. Thus, C(N; v) = Sn seems
to be reasonable, although it does not need to correspond to Core(N; v).
Next, we generalize the concept of the share-core mapping to the concept of
-share-core mappings for functions :G ! IR discussed in the previous section.
Denition 3.1 Let a function :G ! IR be given. Then the -share-core mapping
on G is the mapping C on G given by
C(N; v) =
(
x 2 Snj(N; v)
X
i2E
xi  (E; vE) for all E  N
)
; (N; v) 2 G:
The set C(N; v) of share vectors x 2 S
n is called the -share-core of the n-player
game (N; v).
The denition says that the -share-core of a game (N; v) with (N; v) 6= 0, consists
of all share vectors x such that the total share of every coalition E  N is at least as
high as the ratio of the -value of the subgame corresponding to E over the -value
of the original game (N; v). If (N; v) = 0 then each share vector in Sn belongs to
the -share-core of (N; v) if (E; vE)  0 for all E  N , while the -share-core is
empty if there is an E  N with (E; vE) > 0. For the Shapley -function given by
S(N; v) = v(N) for all (N; v) 2 G, the corresponding -share-core is the share-core
C(N; v). Therefore we also call CS (N; v) the Shapley share-core of (N; v), and CS
the Shapley share-core mapping. The -share-core of a game (N; v) can be obtained as
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the Shapley share-core of the game (N; v) dened by v(E) = (E; vE) for all E  N .
From this it follows immediately that the -share-core is convex.
Corollary 3.2 For given :G ! IR and game (N; v) 2 G, the -share-core C(N; v)
is convex.
The next lemma shows that a share vector in C(N; v) is nonnegative for every
game (N; v) with (N; v) > 0 in a subgame closed subclass C  G.
Lemma 3.3 For given :G ! IR, let C  G be subgame closed and let (N; v) 2 C
be such that (N; v) > 0. Then for every share vector x 2 C(N; v) it holds that
xi(N; v)  0 for all i 2 N .
Proof: Since C is subgame closed, we have that (E; vE) 2 C for all E  N . Since
C  G it follows that (E; vE)  0 for every E  N . Let x 2 C(N; v). Taking
E = fig it follows from (N; v)xi  (fig; vfig)  0 and (N; v) > 0 that xi  0 for
all i 2 N . 2
The following lemma appears to be useful when comparing with each other the
corresponding share-cores of two functions  and 0 on G.
Lemma 3.4 For given :G ! IR and 0:G ! IR, let C  G \ G0 be subgame closed,
(N; v) 2 C with (N; v) > 0 and  > 0. Then it holds that
(i) C(N; v)  C0(N; v) if 
0(N; v)(E; vE)  (N; v)
0(E; vE) for all E  N ;
(ii) C(N; v) = C0(N; v) if 
0(E; vE) = (E; vE) for all E  N .
Proof: (i) First, since C  G\G0 and C is subgame closed, we have that (E; vE)  0
and 0(E; vE)  0 for all E  N . Second, suppose that x 2 C(N; v). Then, according
to Lemma 3.3 we have that xi(N; v)  0 for all i 2 N . When (E; vE) = 0 it
follows from 0(N; v)(E; vE)  (N; v)
0(E; vE) and (N; v) > 0 that 
0(E; vE) = 0,
and hence 0(N; v)
P
i2E xi  0 = 
0(E; vE). When (E; vE) > 0, it follows from
0(N; v)(E; vE)  (N; v)













i2E xi  1. Hence 
0(N; v)
P
i2E xi  
0(E; vE) for every
E  N and thus x 2 C0(N; v).
(ii) Since 0(E; vE) = (E; vE) it holds that 
0(N; v)(E; vE) = (N; v)(E; vE) =
(N; v)0(E; vE), E  N . Since (N; v) > 0 and hence also 
0(N; v) = (N; v) > 0
it follows from (i) that C(N; v) = C0(N; v). 2
4 Some examples and properties of -share-cores
In this section we discuss some examples of -share-cores. We have already discussed
the Shapley share-core (being equal to the share-core C(N; v) as mentioned in the
introduction) that is generated by the function S . An alternative is the Banzhaf
share-core that is generated by B. Comparing these two we conclude that the Banzhaf
share-core is not always contained in the Shapley share-core, nor the other way around
as the following example shows.
Example 4.1 Let (N; v) 2 G be given by N = f1; 2; 3g and v = uf1;2g+uf1;2;3g. Then




0 if E 2 ff1g; f2g; f3g; f1; 3g; f2; 3gg
1 if E = f1; 2g
7
4
if E = f1; 2; 3g:
From this it follows that8





































With S(E; vE) = v(E) it follows that






































8By Conv A we denote the convex hull of A  IRn.
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Thus the Banzhaf share-core C

B (N; v) is a strict subset of the Shapley share-core
CS(N; v).
Next, consider the game (N; v) 2 G given by N = f1; 2; 3g and v = uf1;2g +




0 if E 2 ff1g; f2g; f3g; f2; 3gg
1 if E 2 ff1; 2g; f1; 3gg
5
4
if E = f1; 2; 3g;
and it follows that
C























































Thus, CS (N; v) is a strict subset of CB (N; v).
In van der Laan and van den Brink (1998) the Banzhaf share function is char-
acterized using B:G ! IR given by B(N; v) = 2n 1B(N; v) =
P
EN (2jEj  n)v(E).
Although B and B yield the same share function, they do not yield the same -share-
cores, as the following example shows.
Example 4.2 Consider the rst game (N; v) of Example 4.1. We already determined
CB (N; v). Further, with 
B(N; v) = 22B(N; v) it follows that
C
B



















































(N; v) 6= CB (N; v).
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(N; v). The next theorem shows that this is always true for monotone games.
Therefore we refer to the share-core generated by B as the Large Banzhaf share-core.
Theorem 4.3 If (N; v) 2 G is monotone then CB (N; v)  CB (N; v).
Proof: Let (N; v) 2 G be monotone. If v = v0 (i.e. v0(E) = 0 for all E  N , see
Section 2) then B(E; vE) = 
B(E; vE) = 0 for all E  N , and hence by denition
CB (N; v) = CB (N; v) = S
n. If v 6= v0, then B(N; v) > 0 and B(N; v) > 0. More-













. From part (i)
of Lemma 3.4 it then follows that C

B (N; v)  C

B(N; v). 2
As shown in Example 4.1 for the Banzhaf share-core, also the Large Banzhaf
share-core may contain elements not in the Shapley share-core and reversely. This is
shown in the next example.
Example 4.4 Let (N; v) 2 G be given by N = f1; 2; 3g and v = uf1;2g + uf1;3g. For
every E  N it holds that S(E; vE) = v(E) and











































0 if E 2 ff1g; f2g; f3g; f2; 3gg
2 if E 2 ff1; 2g; f1; 3gg
8 if E = f1; 2; 3g;
and it follows that
C
B

















































Thus, CS (N; v) is a strict subset of CB (N; v).
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0 if jEj = 1
1 if jEj = 2 or E  ff1; 2; 4g; f1; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 4gg
2 if E = f1; 2; 3g
24 if E = N:




0 if jEj = 1
2 if jEj = 2
6 if E  ff1; 2; 4g; f1; 3; 4g; f2; 3; 4g
9 if E = f1; 2; 3g
130 if E = N:
It is not dicult to verify that for this four player game the Large Banzhaf share-core
C
B
(N; v) is a strict subset of the Shapley share-core CS(N; v).
To give an example of a game for which the Large Banzhaf share-core is a strict
subset of the Shapley share-core we need at least four players. The next theorem states
that for games with at most three players and v(E)  0 for all E  N , the Shapley
share-core is always contained in the Large Banzhaf core.
Theorem 4.5 For every (N; v) 2 G with jN j  3 and v(E)  0 for all E  N , it
holds that CS (N; v)  CB(N; v).
Proof: If (N; v) is not monotone then there exist E  F  N such that v(E) >
v(F )  0. Then CS (N; v) = ; and thus CS(N; v)  CB(N; v). Next, suppose that
(N; v) is monotone. If v = v0 then C
B
(N; v) = CS (N; v) = S
n. If v 6= v0 then
S(N; v) > 0 and we distinguish the following three cases:
(i) If n = 1 then B(N; v) = v(N) = S(N; v) > 0. With part (i) of Lemma 3.4 it
follows that the proposition is true in this case.
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(ii) If n = 2 then B(N; v) = 2v(N) > 0. The condition of part (i) of Lemma

















and the condition is
satised.
(iii) If n = 3 then B(N; v) =
P














































. Hence the condition of part (i) of Lemma
3.4 is satised. 2
It is well-known that the Core, and hence also the Shapley share-core, can be
empty, even for monotone games. However, for monotone games the Large Banzhaf
share-core has the nice property of being not empty. To prove the next theorem, remark
that a monotone game (N; v) is convex if for every E  F  N and every i 2 E it
holds that v(F )  v(F n fig)  v(E)  v(E n fig).
Theorem 4.6 If (N; v) 2 G is monotone it holds that C

B(N; v) 6= ;.
Proof: If v = v0 then C
B
(N; v) = Sn. For v 6= v0 (and thus B(N; v) > 0) dene
the game (N;w) by w(E) = 
B(E;vE)
B(N;v)
for every E  N: Monotonicity of (N; v) implies
that for every E  F  N and every i 2 E it holds that
B(F; vF )  


























(v(H)  v(H n fjg)) = B(E; vE)  
B(E n fig; vEnfig));
and hence also w(F ) w(F n fig)  w(E) w(E n fig). Thus (N;w) is a convex game
and so Core(N;w) 6= ;. Hence, by denition of the game (N;w) it follows that
C
B




B(E;wE); E  Ng
= fx 2 IRn j
X
i2N






; E  Ng
= fy 2 IRn j
X
i2N
yi = w(N) and
X
i2E
yi  w(E); E  Ng
= Core(N;w) 6= ;:
2
Having showed that the Large Banzhaf share core is not empty for monotone
games, we now consider the question how `small' the Large Banzhaf share-core can be
on the class of monotone games. The next example shows that there exist monotone
games for which the Large Banzhaf share-core contains exactly one element.
Example 4.7 Consider the monotone game (N; v) given by v(E) = , E  N , for
some  > 0. According to Theorem 4.6 the Large Banzhaf share-core C

B(N; v) is not
empty. Suppose that x 2 C
B
(N; v). For every E  N it holds that B(E; vE) = jEj,








: Considering all E  N with jEj = 1
this yields that xi 
1
n
for all i 2 E. Since
P




i 2 E. Hence, C
B
(N; v) contains only one element.
We conclude this section by considering weighted majority voting games. A
weighted majority voting game on N is a game (N; v) 2 G for which there exist numbers
s; s1; : : : ; sn 2 IN such that v(E) = 1 if
P




i2N si < s 
P
i2N si. We call a coalition E  N winning (respectively losing)
if v(E) = 1 (respectively v(E) = 0). Clearly a weighted majority voting game is
monotone and also proper , i.e. v(N n E) = 0 if v(E) = 1. Moreover v(N) = 1 and
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so it is not a null game. It is well-known that the Core (and hence also the Shapley
share-core) of a weighted mojority voting game is empty if the game does not have a
veto player.9 However, since any weighted majority voting game is monotone, it follows
from Theorem 4.6 that the Large Banzhaf share-core is not empty on the class of these
games. The Banzhaf share-core may be empty, but for non-emptyness the existence of
a veto player is not required, as is shown in the next example.
Example 4.8 Consider the weighted majority voting game (N; v) on N = f1; 2; 3g
such that the winning coalitions are the ones that contain at least two players, i.e.
v(E) = 1 if jEj  2 and v(E) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, their is no veto player and so the




0 if jEj = 1
1 if jEj = 2
3
2
if jEj = 3;
and B(E; vE) = 2






































































So, the Shapley share-core is empty, the large Banzhaf share-core is non-empty but
quite large, and the Banzhaf share-core consists of a unique element. This last share-
core seems very reasonable in this case.
5 Characterization of the -share-core mapping
The traditional core for value vectors has been characterized by Peleg (1986) by using
the concept of the Davis-Maschler reduced game. For a given game (N; v) 2 G and
9A player i is a veto player if i 2 E for all E such that v(E) = 1.
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payo vector y 2 IRn, the DM-y-reduced game of the nonempty coalition T  N is




0 if E = ;
v(N) 
P
i2NnE yi if E = T
maxFNnT fv(E [ F )) 
P
i2F yig otherwise:
To give a characterization of the -share-core mapping for given function  on G we
rst generalize this concept of the Davis-Maschler reduced game.
Denition 5.1 For given function :G ! IR, game (N; v) in G and share vector
x 2 Sn, the DM-(; x)-reduced game of (N; v) 2 G of the nonempty coalition T  N













if E = T
maxFNnT
n





Since x 2 Sn, for E = T the condition can be rewritten as
(E; vT;;x
E




From the denition above it follows straightforward that when the function  is taken
to be S(N; v) = v(N), the DM-(; x)-reduced game (T; vT;;x) for given share vector
x is equal to the standard Davis-Maschler reduced game (T; vT;y) with the vector y
given by yi(N; v) = xiv(N), i 2 N . Although the Davis-Maschler reduced game is
uniquely determined for every vector y and every T  N , existence and uniqueness of
the DM-(; x)-reduced game is not guaranteed for arbitrary function  on G and share
vector x, as is illustrated in the following examples.
Example 5.2 First, consider the game (N; v) 2 G given by N = f1; 2; 3g, v =






)> 2 Sn. Let :G ! IR be given
by (N; v) =
P
i2N v(fig). So, (N; v) = 1 and for T = f1; 2g, the DM-(; x)-reduced
game (T; vT;;x) must satisfy










; i = 1; 2
18






Thus, it must hold that
P
i2f1;2g v








; i = 1; 2. Clearly, there is no game (T; vT;;x) that satises these
conditions.
Next, consider the game (N; v) 2 G given by N = f1; 2; 3g, v = uf3g and take






)>. Now, let  be given by (N; v) = maxEN v(E),
so that (N; v) = 1. For T = f1; 2g, the DM-(; x)-reduced game (T; vT;;x) must
satisfy










; i = 1; 2






Clearly, all games (T; v) with v(fig) = 1
2
; i = 1; 2 and v(T )  1
2
satisfy these conditions
and hence the DM-(; x)-reduced game (T; vT;;x) is not uniquely determined.
Thus, in general DM-(; x)-reduced games need not exist nor be unique. However, it
turns out that they are uniquely determined on G if  is linear on G and positive for
all unanimity games.
Theorem 5.3 Let :G ! IR be linear on G and positive for all unanimity games. Let
(N; v) 2 G be an n-player game and x 2 Sn. Then for every T  N , the DM-(; x)-
reduced game (T; vT;;x) exists and is uniquely determined.
Proof: For given (N; v) 2 G, T  N , a share vector x 2 Sn and a linear function 
on G being positive for all unanimity games, let (T; vT;;x) 2 G be a DM-(; x)-reduced
game for the coalition T . To show the existence and uniqueness of (T; vT;;x), we prove
that there exist unique dividends v;T;x (E), E  T , by induction on jEj.







(E)(E; uE). Since (E; uE) > 0 by assumption, it holds that the dividend







is uniquely determined. Proceeding by induction
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assume that for some given integer k  1 and for any H  T with jHj  k we have
determined the dividends vT;;x (H), and let E  T be such that jEj = k + 1. First,
consider the case that jEj < jT j. Then by denition, the DM-(; x)-reduced game












Let the maximum be attained at F   N n T . Then
(E; vT;;x
E























































(E) is uniquely determined. Hence all the dividends vT;;x (E) = vT;;x
E
(E)
exist and are uniquely determined and therefore it holds that all the values vT;;x(E) =P
HE vT;;x (E)u
H(E) exist and are uniquely determined for all E  T , and so are
(T; vT;;x) for all T  N . 2
In the following we will give an axiomatic characterization of the -share-core.
To do so, we rst introduce a modied version of the standard converse reduced game
property in case  is given by S(N; v) = v(N) and prove that the -share-core satises
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this so-called converse DM--reduced game property for share mappings. To state this
property, for given vector x 2 Sn and subset H  N , let the jHj-dimensional vector
















i2H xi = 0:
(2)
Axiom 5.4 (Converse DM--reduced game property) For given :G ! IR, a
share mapping M on G satises the converse DM--reduced game property on a subset
C of G if for every (N; v) 2 C with jN j  2 and for every nonnegative x 2 Sn it holds
that x 2M(N; v) if xH 2M(H; vH;;x) for every H  N with jHj = 2.
Although this property will not appear in the rst characterization that we present in
this section, the proof of that characterization makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5 Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all unanimity games. Then the
-share-core mapping C on G satises the converse DM--reduced game property on
G.
Proof: Since  is linear and positive for all unanimity games, we have that all reduced
games exist and are uniquely determined according to Theorem 5.3. Let (N; v) 2 G with
jN j  2 and suppose that the nonnegative vector x 2 Sn satises xH 2 C(H; v
H;;x)
for all H  N with jHj = 2.
Since x is nonnegative and
P
i2N xi = 1, for every nonempty T  N , T 6= N ,
there exists some i 2 T and h 2 N n T such that xi + xh > 0. Take such an i and
h and set H = fi; hg. By assumption it then holds that xH 2 C(H; v
H;;x) and thus




(fig; vH;;xfig ) = max
FNnH
0










and x 2 Sn it then holds that
(T; vT )  (N; v)
X
k2T
xk = (T; vT )  (N; v)
X
k2Tnfig












= (N; v)xi   (N; v)xi = 0:
Thus, (N; v)
P
j2T xj  (T; vT ) for all T  N , T 6= N . But then x 2 C(N; v). Thus,
the -share-core mapping C satises the converse DM--reduced game property. 2
We now state axioms that characterize the -share-core mapping. The rst one is
well-known.
Axiom 5.6 (Non-emptyness) A share mapping M on G satises non-emptyness on
C  G if for every (N; v) 2 C it holds that M(N; v) 6= ;.
The next two axioms generalize familiar properties in case  is given by S(N; v) =
v(N) for all (N; v) 2 G.
Axiom 5.7 (-Individual rationality) Let :G ! IR be given. A share mapping M
on G satises -individual rationality on C  G if for every (N; v) 2 C with (N; v) 6= 0
and for every x 2M(N; v), it holds that xi 
(fig;vfig)
(N;v)
for all i 2 N .
To state the next axiom, for two sets X;Y  IRn and positive real numbers
a; b > 0 we dene the set aX + bY  IRn by aX + bY = fax+ by j x 2 X; y 2 Y g.
Axiom 5.8 (-Superadditivity) Let :G ! IR be given. A share mapping M sat-
ises -superadditivity on C  G if for all pairs of games (N; v); (N;w) 2 C such that
(N; v+w) 2 C it holds that (N; v)M(N; v)+(N;w)M(N;w)  (N; v+w)M(N; v+
w).
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The next axiom states that if x belongs to the solution set M(N; v) 2 Sn of a
game, then for any H  N , the jHj dimensional vector xH as dened in equation (2)
belongs to the solution set M(H; vH;;x) of the reduced game.
Axiom 5.9 (DM--reduced game property) Let :G ! IR be given. A share
mapping M satises the DM--reduced game property on C  G if for every (N; v) 2 C,
x 2M(N; v), and every H  N; H 6= ;, it holds that xH 2M(H; vH;;x).
Next, following Peleg (1986) for S(N; v) = v(N), we will characterize the -
share-core mapping on subgame closed subsets of the class of -balanced games. For
a function  on G, a game (N; v) 2 G is called -balanced if C(N; v) 6= ;. Let G
B

denote the collection of all -balanced games (N; v) in G, i.e.
GB

= f(N; v) 2 G j (N; v)  0 and C(N; v) 6= ;g:
The characterization follows from the next two lemma's.
Lemma 5.10 Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all unanimity games. Then the




and -individual rationality, the DM--reduced game property and -superadditivity on
any subgame closed subset C of G.




denition C satises -individual rationality on C  G. To show the DM--reduced
game property on C  G, let (N; v) 2 G
B

; x 2 C(N; v), and H  N; H 6= ;.
Since  is linear and positive for all unanimity games, it follows from Theorem 5.3 that
all reduced games (H; vH;;x), H  N , exist and are uniquely determined. We have
to prove that xH 2 C(H; v





First, suppose that (N; v) = 0. If there is an E  N with v(E) > 0 then
C(N; v) = ;, and so the DM--reduced game property is satised in this case. Oth-
erwise, v(E)  0 for all E  N and C(N; v) = S
n. In that case it follows from
Denition 5.1 that (H; vH;;x) = 0 and (E; vH;;x)  0 for all E  H; E 6= H. But
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then C(H; v
H;;x) = Sn = C(N; v). So, the DM--reduced game property is satised
if (N; v) = 0.
Now, suppose that (N; v) > 0. Since C is subgame closed, according to Lemma 3.3
we have that xi  0, for all i 2 N . Hence xh = 0 for all h 2 H if
P
h2H xh = 0.
Since according to equation (1), (H; vH;;x) = (N; v)
P
h2H xh and x 2 S
n, for every































h2H xh = 0, then xh = 0 for all h 2 H and hence xi = 0 for all i 2 E,










































































since by assumption x 2 C(N; v) and hence (N; v)
P
i2E[F xi  (E [ F; vE[F ) for
all E [ F  N . Thus, xH 2 C(H; v
H;;x).
To show -superadditivity of C, let (N; v); (N;w) 2 C be such that (N; v+w) 2
C  G, and let x 2 C(N; v) and x
0 2 C(N;w). For every E  N it then
24
holds that (N; v)
P











= 1. But then additivity of  and the fact that vE + wE = (v + w)E yield
(N; v)
P





= (N; v) + (N;w) = (N; v + w), and for every
E  N , (N; v)
P





 (E; vE) + (E;wE) = (E; (v + w)E),
and thus (N; v)x + (N;w)x0 2 (N; v + w)C(N; v + w). Thus, C satises -
superadditivity on subgame closed subsets C of G. 2
The second lemma states the reverse.
Lemma 5.11 Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all unanimity games. Let M
be a share mapping satisfying non-emptyness on GB

, and -individual rationality, the
DM--reduced game property and -superadditivity on G. Then it holds that M(N; v) =




Proof: Since  is linear and positive for all unanimity games, according to Theorem
5.3 all reduced games (H; vH;;x), H  N , exist and are uniquely determined. To prove
that the mapping M must be equal to C on G
B

, we rst consider the case n = 1.
Then non-emptyness and -individual rationality of M yields that M(N; v) = fx 2




both M(N; v)  C(N; v) and C(N; v) M(N; v), so that M(N; v) = C(N; v).
First, we show that M(N; v)  C(N; v). Let (N; v) 2 G
B

and x 2M(N; v). If
n = 2, then -individual rationality implies that (N; v)xi  (fig; vfig), for i 2 N .
Since also
P
i2N xi = 1 it follows that x 2 C(N; v).
If n  3, then the DM--reduced game property of M implies that xH 2M(H; vH;;x)
for all H  N . In particular this is true for jHj = 2. But then, as shown above for
n = 2, it follows from the property of -individual rationality that xH 2 C(H; v
H;;x),
for all H  N; jHj = 2 and thus x 2 C(N; v) according to Lemma 5.5. So, M(N; v) 




Second, to prove that C(N; v)  M(N; v), let (N; v) 2 G
B

and x 2 C(N; v).
We rst consider the case that n  3. Therefore, construct the game (N;w) by setting
(fig; wfig) = (fig; vfig) for all i 2 N , and (E;wE) = (N; v)
P
i2E xi for every
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E  N with jEj  2. Since x 2 Sn it holds that (N;w) = (N; v), and thus
C(N;w) = fx





geq(E;wE); E  Ng








xi if jEj  2 and (N; v)x
0
i
 (fig; vfig); 8i 2 Ng
= fxg:
Because (N; v) 2 GB

, we have that (N;w) = (N; v)  0. Moreover C(N;w) = fxg
is not empty. Hence (N;w) 2 GB

and thus by assumption M(N;w) is not empty.
However above we have shown that M(N;w)  C(N;w) = fxg. Hence M(N;w) =
C(N;w) = fxg. Now, dene the game (N; z) by z(E) = v(E)  w(E) for all E  N .
Linearity of  implies that (E; zE) = (E; vE)   (E;wE) for all E  N . Hence, by
construction of (N;w) it follows that (fig; zfig) = 0 for all i 2 N and that (N; z) =
(N; v)   (N;w) = 0. Furthermore, since x 2 C(N; v), it holds that (E; zE) =
(E; vE)   (N; v)
P
i2E xi  0 for every E  N , 2  jEj  n. Hence C(N; z) = S
n
is not empty. Since (N; z) = 0, it follows that (N; z) 2 GB

and hence M(N; z)  Sn
is not empty. Since, C(N; z) = S
n, it follows that M(N; z)  C(N; z). Applying the
-superadditivity of M on v = z + w it follows with (N; z) = 0 and (M(N;w) = fxg
that (N;w)fxg = (N; z)M(N; z) + (N;w)M(N;w)  (N; v)M(N; v), and thus
x 2M(N; v). Hence C(N; v) M(N; v) for every (N; v) 2 G
B

with n  3.
It remains to consider the case n = 2. Therefore, for h 62 N , let the three play-
er game (N 0; w) be given by N 0 = N [ fhg, (N 0; w) = (N; v), and (E;wE) =P
i2E\N (fig; vfig) for every E  N
0. Suppose x 2 C(N; v). Then, for x
0 2 S3 given
by x0
i
= xi for i 2 N , and x
0
h
= 0 it holds that x0 2 C(N
0; w). Hence C(N
0; w)
is not empty and (N 0; w) = (N; v)  0, thus (N 0; w) 2 GB

. Since jN 0j = 3 the
case n  3 applies and hence it holds that x0 2 M(N 0; w) as shown above. Fur-
ther, from the construction of (N 0; w) and x0, it follows that for N  N 0 the re-
duced game (N;wN;;x
0
) = (N; v). The DM--reduced game property then implies
that (x0)N = x 2 M(N;wN;;x
0
) = M(N; v) and thus also in case n = 2 it holds that
C(N; v) M(N; v). 2
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The proof of the Main Theorem follows immediately from the two lemma's stated
above.
Theorem 5.12 Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all unanimity games and let
M be a mapping on a subgame closed subset C of GB

. Then M satises non-emptyness,
-individual rationality, the DM--reduced game property and -superadditivity on C
if and only if M is the -share-core mapping on C.
Proof: The proof follows immediately from Lemma 5.10 and Lemma 5.11. 2
The Main Theorem characterizes the -share-core mapping as the unique non-empty
mapping satisfying -individual rationality, the DM--reduced game property and -
superadditivity on a given subgame closed subset C of GB

.
We conclude this section by generalizing another result from Peleg (1986). In
that result we use -individual rationality for two person games which requires the
-individual rationality property to hold only for games with two players.
Theorem 5.13 Let :G ! IR be linear and positive for all unanimity games and let
C be a subgame closed subset of G. Then the share mapping M satises the DM-
-reduced game property, the converse DM--reduced game property, and -individual
rationality for two person games on C if and only if it is equal to the -share-core
mapping.
Proof: First, observe that C satises the three properties. According to Lemma
5.5 the converse DM--reduced game property is satised. The DM--reduced game
property and -individual rationality for two person games is satised according to
Lemma 5.10.
Second, suppose that M satises the three properties on G, and let (N; v) 2 G.
If n = 1 then by denition M(N; v) = fx 2 IR j x = 1g = C(N; v). If n = 2 then
-individual rationality for two person games and the fact that M(N; v)  S2 imply
that M(N; v) = C(N; v).
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It remains to consider n  3. Observe that all reduced games exist and are unique-
ly determined because  is linear and positive for all unanimity games. Now, let x 2
M(N; v). The DM--reduced game property ofM then implies that xH 2M(H; v;H;x)
for every H  N with jHj = 2. But then xH 2 C(H; v
H;;x) for every H  N with
jHj = 2, as shown above. The converse DM--reduced game property of C then im-
plies that x 2 C(N; v). Thus, M(N; v)  C(N; v). Along the same lines it follows
that C(N; v) M(N; v). Hence M(N; v) = C(N; v). 2
Note that Theorem 5.13 characterizes the -share-core mapping on subgame closed
subsets of G, whereas Theorem 5.12 characterizes it on subgame closed subsets of G
B

for which it is not empty by denition.
6 Marginal shares and -convex games
In this section we rst give an alternative denition of the class of share functions
given in Theorem 2.1.(ii) by using marginal contributions. Therefore, we rst extend
Theorem 2.1 from subclasses of the class G+

of -positive games to subclasses of the
set G, so allowing for games to which the function  assigns the value zero. The next
corollary follows immediately from part (i) of Theorem 2.1 by requiring that  satises
the equal share property in case (N; v) is a game with (N; v) = 0, i.e. 
i
(N; v) = 1
n
for all i 2 N when (N; v) 2 C \ G0 .
Corollary 6.1 Let :G ! IR be additive and symmetric on G, and let C  G be a
subgame closed set containing all positively scaled unanimity games. Then there exists
a unique share function  on C satisfying (i) symmetry and -additivity on C, (ii) the
null player property on C \ G+, and (iii) the equal share property on C \ G

0
The marginal value vector of game (N; v) and permutation :N ! N is the vec-
tor m(N; v) given m
i
(N; v) = mi
P (;i)[fig(N; v) = v(P (; i) [ fig)   v(P (; i)) with
P (; i) := fj 2 N j (j) < (i)g for all i 2 N . Thus, the marginal value vector
corresponding to permutation  assigns to player i its marginal contribution to the
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worth of the coalition consisting of all its predecessors in . Using these marginal
value vectors the Shapley value can also be expressed as the average of these marginal




(N; v), where (N)
denotes the collection of all permutations on N . A similar expression can be given for
share functions. So, let :G ! IR be given and suppose that the entrance of the players
in forming the `grand coalition' is given by permutation :N ! N on the set N of
players. Then we dene the share function ; in which the shares are determined by







(P (;i)[fig;vP (;i)[fig) (P (;i);vP (;i))
(N;v)





The share vector ;(N; v) is called the marginal share vector of (N; v) corresponding
to  and permutation . If players enter the `grand coalition' according to permutation
 then the rst player (1) when entering gets full share

;























and the share of the new player (2) is the remainder ;
(2)(f(1); (2)g; vf(1);(2)g) =
1   ;




(f(1); (2)g; vf(1);(2)g) 6= 0, and is
1
2
otherwise. Proceeding in this way yields the
shares expressed by (4).
Next we state another property for -functions. The function :G ! IR is null
player independent on C  G if for every (N; v) 2 C and every null player i in (N; v)
such that (N n fig; vNnfig) 2 C it holds that (N; v) = (N n fig; vNnfig). Examples
of null player independent functions are S and B. Note that B is not null player
independent. Now, every share function of Corollary 6.1 with  satisfying null player
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independence and such that  assigns zero to null games is equal to the average of all
share vectors ;(N; v) over all  2 (N).
Theorem 6.2 Let :G ! IR be additive, symmetric and null player independent on
G and satisfy (N; v
0) = 0, and let  be the share function of Corollary 6.1. For
every subgame closed subset C of G containing all positively scaled unanimity games,






;(N; v) for all (N; v) 2 C:
Proof: In van den Brink and van der Laan (1999) (Theorem 3.5) it is shown that
(N; v) 2 GS and that 
(N; v) = 
S
(N; v), where (N; v) is given by v(E) =
(E; vE) for all E  N . With the corresponding property of the Shapley value it is
easy to verify that the theorem holds for the Shapley share function 
S
. For the other




Thus, the share function (N; v) satisfying the properties of Corollary 6.1 can be ob-
tained as the average of the marginal share vectors in a similar way as the corresponding
value function can be obtained as the average of the marginal value vectors.
We now turn to the class of convex games (N; v). As stated before the (s-
tandard) Core of a convex game is not empty. Moreover, it is equal to the convex
hull of all marginal vectors of (N; v), i.e. Core(N; v) = Convfm(N; v) j  2 (N)g
and the Shapley value Sh(N; v) is the barycenter of Core(N; v) if (N; v) is a con-
vex game (see Shapley (1971) and Ichiichi (1981)). From this it is easy to verify
that for convex non-null games (N; v), v 6= v0, it holds that the Shapley share core







, and that the Shapley share vector
S(N; v) is the barycenter of CS (N; v).
To generalize these results for other  functions we rst generalize the concept
of convexity. For given function , we call a game -convex if the game that assigns
to every coalition the -value assigned to the subgame restricted to that coalition is
convex.
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Denition 6.3 Let C  G be subgame closed, and let : C ! IR be given. The game
(N; v) 2 G is -convex on C if for every E;F  N it holds that
(E [ F; vE[F ) + (E \ F; vE\F )  (E; vE) + (F; vF ):
For a subgame closed set C  G, (N; v) 2 C, and : C ! IR dene the characteristic
function w on N by w(E) =
(E;vE)
(N;v)
for every E  N if (N; v) 6= 0, and w = v0
otherwise. Note that we already used this transformed game in the proof of Theorem
4.6. As noticed in the proof of Theorem 4.6 it holds that C(N; v) = C(N;w). The
properties for convex games mentioned above then yield the following theorem.
Theorem 6.4 Let :G ! IR be linear, symmetric and null player independent on the
subgame closed subset C  G containing all positively scaled unanimity games, and
satisfy (N; v0) = 0. If (N; v) 2 C is -convex then
(i) C(N; v) 6= ;;
(ii) C(N; v) = Convf
;(N; v) j  2 (N)g if (N; v) 6= 0, and C(N; v) = S
n
if (N; v) = 0;
(iii) (N; v) is the barycenter of C(N; v).
Proof: Let :G ! IR be symmetric and linear on the subgame closed subset C  G,
and let (N; v) 2 C be -convex. Further, let the characteristic function w on N be
given by w(E) = (E;vE)
(N;v)
for all E  N if (N; v) 6= 0, and w = v0 otherwise. Then
-convexity of (N; v) implies convexity of (N;w), and with C(N; v) = CS(N;w) we
obtain the following.
Part (i) follows from the convexity of (N;w) and non-emptyness of the Shapley
share-core of convex games.






(P (; i) [ fig; v(P (;i)[fig))  (P (; i); vP (;i))
(N; v)
= w(P (; i) [ fig) w(P (; i)) = m
i
(N;w); for all i 2 N;
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and the fact that Core(N;w) of a convex game (N;w) is equal to the convex hull of
all marginal vectors m(N;w).
To show Part (iii), rst consider (N; v) 6= 0. Then it follows from Theorem




















w(P (; i) [ fig)  w(P (; i)) = Shi(N;w);




;(N; v) = 1
n
is the barycenter of
Sn = C(N; v). 2
Note that S-convexity coincides with convexity of a game. Thus, trivially, all convex
games are S -convex. Also, all convex games are B-convex, but convex games need
not be B-convex.
Example 6.5 Consider the rst game of Example 4.1. Then the extreme points of the



















)> are the barycenters of the corresponding -share-cores.
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